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CHAPTER I
JURISDICTION
In the vast majority of cases, crimes take place wholly in one
state, involve only citizens of that state and have no discernible
impact beyond that state's borders. There is nothing new, how-
ever, in what may be called multinational crime. In such in-
stances, the acts constituting a crime may take place in more than
one state, or their impact may be felt outside the state in which
they occur. Concretely, such crimes may range from a traffic
violation to murder, from smuggling to counterfeiting to high
treason. The accused, or the victim, may be a member of another
state's armed forces, a tourist, a merchant seaman, a diplomat, or
a foreign business man negotiating a single transaction. The
accused or the victim may be a casual visitor or, on the contrary,
may be residing more or less permanently in the country. Crime,
in brief, involves a whole complex of relationships. Any one or
more of its facets may so concern a state as to prompt it to assert
jurisdiction, or to protest the assertion of jurisdiction by another
state.
In situations so complex, it would be surprising if simple rules
had been or could be formulated which made possible the ready,
frictionless resolution of controversies; especially since suprana-
tional institutions empowered authoritatively to formulate rules
circumscribing the competence of states are largely lacking. 1
Traditional analysis 2 of the problem of criminal jurisdiction
1 See, generally, Falk, "International Jurisdiction : Horizontal and Vertical
Conceptions of Legal Order," 32 Temp. L. Q. 295 (1959).
2 See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect
to Crime, 29 A.J.I.L., Supp., pt. II, 439 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Research, Crime'] ; and the American Law Institute, Restatement, The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, (Proposed Official Draft, May
3, 1962), [hereinafter cited as Restatement, Foreign Relations Law~\. It is
not suggested that these careful analyses do not adequately recognize the
many qualifications and limitations on the recognized bases of criminal
jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that any approach in terms of such
principles is necessarily too rigid and hence to a degree misleading.
nevertheless suggests that such rules exist in terms of the terri-
torial principle, the nationality principle, etc. This analysis has
the virtue of accenting the power of a state to assert jurisdiction
in a wide variety of circumstances; and since the specific bases
of jurisdiction are sufficiently vague, a state may shape its claims
to bring the great majority of cases under one or the other prin-
ciple. The added scope afforded by the position taken in the Lotus
case, 3 that a state's competence is limited only by prohibitive
rules, merely emphasizes the almost plenary power of a state to
assert the applicability of its criminal law.
Confronted with the firmly established rule that no state en-
forces the criminal law of another state, 4 states may try to extend
the reach of their law, in part because they must either apply
their own law or forego prosecution altogether. 5 They have not,
however, characteristically claimed the full range of competence
which the Lotus case views as tolerable. The fact that the recog-
nized bases of jurisdiction are not mutually exclusive seemingly
invites controversy, but such has not been common. Rather, self-
restraint on the part of states, prompted by considerations of
comity, feasibility, and fairness, has resulted in a tolerable accom-
modation of the conflicting interests involved. The Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws summarizes the situation realistically
with this statement: "A state has legislative jurisdiction if its
contacts with a person, thing or occurrence are sufficient to make
it reasonable to apply that state's law to create or affect legal
interests." 6
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Since the emergence of the territorial state, states have claimed
criminal jurisdiction with respect to conduct taking place in their
territory. Every state exercises jurisdiction on this basis and all
states recognize that other states may do so, subject only to cer-
8 Case of the S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927).
4 Harvard Research, Crime, supra, note 2, at 439. The rule may also serve
to obscure the degree to which states are prepared to defer to foreign law
since, if the offense is not extraditable, a state can evidence such willingness
to defer only by releasing the accused.
6 Trautman, Appendix to Chapter 11 of Brewster, Antitrust and American
Business Abroad, 339, (1958). Acquiescing in a request for extradition may
be a third alternative.
8 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, sec. 43 e (Tent. Draft No.
3,1956).
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tain narrow limitations.7 It is implicit that jurisdiction so based
extends to foreigners. "When the nationals of one state enter
the territory of another state, whether for business or pleasure,
they subject themselves to the laws of the latter state and, al-
though those laws and the rules of procedure in the courts may
be wholly different from those which obtain in their home state,
so long as such laws and rules are not below the standard gener-
ally obtaining in well-ordered states and are administered fairly
and impartially, neither the aliens nor their governments have a
right to complain." 8
The soundness of this approach becomes evident when one con-
siders the consequences should any rule of international law make
all aliens immune from the local law, so that any alien a state ad-
mitted to its territory could obey or disobey its laws at his
pleasure. 9 These consequences have been given laboratory demon-
T "It is universally recognized that States are competent, in general, to
punish all crimes committed within their territory. * * * The general prin-
ciple of territorial competence is too well-established to require an extended
discussion of authorities. The principle is basic, of course, in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. It is incorporated in all modern codes." Harvard
Research, Crime, supra, note 2, at 480, 481 ; Article 17, Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law, p. 49.
But "[T]he original conception of law was personal, and it was only the
rise of the modern territorial state that subjected aliens—even when they
happened to be resident in a state not their own—to the law of that state.
International law did not start as the law of a society of states each of
omnicompetent jurisdiction, but of states possessing a personal jurisdiction
over their own nationals and later acquiring a territorial jurisdiction over
resident non-nationals." Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International
Law,lU (1958).
8 2 Hackworth, International Law, 84 (1941). See also Moore, dissenting
opinion in the Lotus case, supra, note 3, at 69; Beckett, "The Exercise of
Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners," 1925 Brit. Yb. Int'l. L. 45.
9 "When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through
another, as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with
the inhabitants of that other; or when merchant vessels enter for the pur-
poses of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society,
and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and
local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.
Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption.
His subjects thus passing into foreign countries, are not employed by him,
nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently, there are powerful
motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction
stration in the countries that have accorded extraterritorial rights
to particular classes of foreigners.
Some have found justification for the territorial principle in
the concept of sovereignty. Others have pointed out that
sovereignty is much too vague a concept to serve as an effective
tool in making the subtle differentiations called for in delimiting
criminal jurisdiction. 10 There are, nevertheless, the soundest of
policy reasons for recognizing the primary jurisdiction of the
state in which the acts occurred as the norm. The allocation of
competence in the world is predominantly in terms of geography,
and political and social institutions are shaped largely by the
concept of the territorial state.
Maintaining public order within its borders is a necessary func-
tion of the modern state. More broadly, the state is recognized
as entitled to determine the kind of social and economic order
which is to prevail in its territory, in keeping with its responsi-
bility to promote the welfare of its citizens. 11 Criminal law, both
in what it prohibits and what it permits, is one of the means of
shaping that order. The competence of the territorial state to
proscribe and its privilege to permit certain activities, by aliens
of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it."
Marshall, C.J., in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 144 (1812). It is to be noted that when this was written, Americans al-
ready enjoyed extraterritorial rights in some countries. See p. 15 et seq. infra.
10 "So long as we know no more of international sovereignty than that
it is equivalent to independence, it will be vain to try, often as the attempt
has been made, to deduce the answers to these questions from sovereignty
itself; it is precisely in reconciling the independence of different authorities,
in the circumstances in which the territories, ships and persons subject to
them may be placed, that the difficulties arise." 1 Westlake, International
Law, 237 (1904). Brierly observed that "* * * [Sovereignty is merely a
term that we find convenient when we wish to refer collectively to a number
of particular powers that states have traditionally claimed for themselves
the right to exercise." Brierly, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 350.
11 "There is general agreement that a state is primarily interested in
events that affect its own safety, public order, and the integrity of its
social system; that is, the distribution of values among those who, by
virtue of citizenship or residence, identify themselves with a particular
community and seek the protection of its laws." Katzenbach, "Conflicts on an
Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and Interna-
tional Law," 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1133 (1956). See also Donnedieu de Vabres,
Les Principles Modemes de Droit Penal International 11-13 (1928).
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as well as its nationals, should be respected. This is so commonly
understood that both look first to the territorial state for protec-
tion of their persons and property and for the rules by which they
govern their own conduct. Respect for law and order may well re-
quire that all who commit like offenses in the same place be tried
in the same courts under the same law.12 Again, elementary no-
tions of fairness—and of personal liberty—may be violated if an
individual is held subject to the criminal law of any state other
than that which he is in, even a state of which he is a national.13
Conversely, charges of unfairness toward an alien on grounds of
lack of notice are in part met by the consideration that, since he
was aware that he was subject to the local law, he should have in-
formed himself of its prohibitions. Lack of sympathy for, or
understanding of, local attitudes reflected in local law may affect
the alien's conduct, but should not be confused with lack of notice.
Anglo-American adherence to the territorial principle ap-
parently has its roots in considerations of purely domestic law
stemming from the early status of jurors as witnesses as well as
triers of issues of fact. 14 At common law, venue was laid at the
place of the crime 15 and the right to be tried where the crime was
committed is still a fundamental protection accorded the accused. 16
By the same token, perhaps the most persuasive argument for the
territorial principle is that trial at the place of the crime is es-
sential to the effective administration of justice. This argument is
based on such factors as investigation, availability and attendance
of witnesses, and production of evidence. All of the considera-
tions which bear upon venue in domestic law are pertinent. Trial
12 Westchester County v. Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y. Supp. 2d 31,
(City Ct, New Rochelle, 1946), 41 A.J.I.L. 690 (1947).
18
It seems overdramatic to refer to "[T]he system of tying the entire
criminal law of a country around the neck of a subject, and of making him
liable to its operation in whatever part of the world he may be * * *."
Lewis, Foreign Jurisdiction and the Extradition of Criminals 29 (1859).
But see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
;
Bar, International Law, 631, 662 (Gillespie transl., 1883).
" Cook, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Law," Selected
Readings on Conflict of Laws, 71, 74 (1956) ; Berge, "Jurisdiction and the
Territorial Principle," 30 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 239-240 (1931).
16 "At common law venue was laid at the 'place' of the crime and * * *
venue merged into jurisdiction and joined forces with sovereignty." Katzen-
bach, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 1141.
16 Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961).
at a distance may, moreover, cause delays and thus introduce
another element of unfairness to the accused. 17
These considerations emphasize the legitimate concern of the
territorial state with activities taking place within its territory
and suggest that its primary competence to apply its criminal law
should be respected. States are moved to exercise jurisdiction
over acts taking place within their territory not primarily be-
cause they take place there—though that may be the rationaliza-
tion—but because, since they take place there, they affect the
primary interests of the state or of its citizens.
This is far from saying, however, that only the territorial state
can have such interest and competence, or even that in every case
they are primary. A state is too concerned with the activities
abroad of its private citizens, its representatives and its armed
forces; with its foreign trade and commerce and the foreign in-
vestments of its citizens ; with the flow of the means of payment
;
with the gathering and dissemination of information; with, in
short, everything which affects its position in the world, not to be
vitally interested in many matters occurring beyond its borders.18
Geographical isolation, which may have been a factor in the
traditional Anglo-American adherence to the territorial principle,
no longer protects a state from the impact of acts outside its
borders. The result has been, and is, increasing pressure by in-
dividual states to extend the application of their law to activities
taking place abroad. 19
17 Donnedieu de Vabres, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 11. 1 Pitt Cobbett's
Cases on International Law 44, (5th ed., Grey, 1931). Lewis, Foreign
Jurisdiction and Extradition of Criminals 30 (1859).
18 "Within the world community, methods of policy prescription and ap-
plication are territorially organized within a framework of separate
sovereignties. But the values that states seek to achieve jointly and severally
as well as the means of achievement are not so easily related to geography.
Policy is conceived in functional terms, and the basis of power—persons and
wealth—move across state lines with relative ease." Katzenbach, op. dt.
supra, note 11, at 1151, note 11, at 1095.
19 "In earlier days, when there may have been an attempt to delimit
transactions, to assign them to exclusive regulating jurisdictions, and, at
the same time, when there was perhaps less felt need and less energy for
the enforcement of regulations beyond geographical boundaries, Locus regit
actum was a perfectly rational working principle, both as an explanation of
the assertion of jurisdiction and as a restraint on the undue extension of
jurisdiction." Trautman, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 315.
In reviewing the context in which the status of forces problem
arises, it is useful to consider the efforts of states to extend the
reach of their laws and to resist such efforts by other states. It
should be borne in mind, however, that the claim of a receiving
state to try a member of a visiting armed force involves no effort
to extend the reach of its law; its claim is rooted in the terri-
torial principle in its simplest, geographical sense. The sending
state resists invocation of the territorial principle because it be-
lieves other factors outweigh those which reinforce the territorial
principle and claims the right to apply its law extraterritorially
to its troops.
States moved to extend the range of application of their crimi-
nal law have asserted jurisdiction that is in substance extra-
territorial, without acknowledging its essentially extraterritorial
character, by expansion of the territorial principle. It has been
pointed out that improvements in transportation and communica-
tion facilities and the increasing complexity of criminal acts re-
quired and justified such expansion. Courts and legislatures have
responded ; courts have interpreted statutes punishing crimes com-
mitted in the state to include situations in which the crime took
place only partly within the state, and legislatures have partici-
pated in expanding the principle through statutes broadening the
definitions of specific crimes, i.e., larceny, to include possession
within the state of goods stolen outside. Theories regarding the
nature of and locus of crime, e.g., the French principle of
indivisibilite and connexite, have been formulated or developed in
aid of the process. Jurisdiction on the objective territorial prin-
ciple relating to crimes begun outside but consummated within a
state has been more widely asserted than on the subjective prin-
ciple relating to crimes begun within a state but consummated
outside. This is understandable because the former centers on the
impact of criminal acts, the latter on the intention with which
acts are undertaken. Assertions based on either principle are,
however, recognized as valid. Generally, a criminal engaged in
exporting crime may be called to account in either the state from
or to which he exports. Jurisdiction has been extended to cover
participation within a state in a crime committed abroad, even
though participation is, in domestic law, frequently treated as a
separate crime. Jurisdiction has even been asserted with respect
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to an unsuccessful attempt outside a state to commit a crime
within that state.20
The effort of states to extend the application of their laws to
situations in which the territorial link is so tenuous suggests a
need to protect the state and its citizens, regardless of where the
acts prejudicing their interests take place. The motivation is
sufficiently compelling to lead states to assert jurisdiction which
is explicitly extraterritorial. The contrary effort to enshrine the
territorial principle as the exclusive basis of jurisdiction never
prevailed.21
Under the traditional analysis, assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction are rationalized under the headings of the nationality,
protective, passive personality and universality principles—to list
them in the declining order of their acceptability. Such an
analysis of problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction in terms of
these principles can be most misleading for it suggests that the
only relevant inquiry is whether there is a discernible link to the
state asserting jurisdiction. An inquiry so limited fails to take
into account that a balancing of the interests of states, not the
interest of a single state, should determine the propriety of an
assertion of jurisdiction. This type of analysis also fails to place
proper emphasis on the self-restraint which states in fact exercise
in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.22
80 Articles 17 and 18, Restatement, Foreign Relations Laiv, pp. 49, 52.
Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, sec. 43 f, comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1956) ; Harvard Research, Crime, supra, note 2, at 480-508. 29
A.J.I.L., Supp., pt. II, 480-508; Trautman, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 315-321;
Katzenbach, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 1142.
81
1 Hyde, International Law 726 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 Moore, International
Law 225 (1906).
The prevailing view was stated in the Lotus case, supra, note 3, at 20:
"Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle of the territorial
character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true that all or
nearly all these systems of law extend their action to offenses committed
outside the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in
ways which vary from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law,
therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and by no
means coincides with territorial sovereignty."
88 Mr. Justice Jackson, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), in-
volving the reach of the Jones Act, put the point admirably, saying, at 581
et seq:
"[T]he virtue and utility of sea-borne commerce lies in its frequent
and important contacts with more than one country. If, to serve some
immediate interest, the courts of each were to exploit every such contact
9
The link between a state and an isolated occurrence may be so
insubstantial as in itself to raise a due process or denial of justice
question. The link may, however, be inherently adequate and the
assertion of jurisdiction nevertheless objectionable because of the
conflicting interests of other states. A major consideration is
whether the conduct is offensive to the law of all the states in-
volved, or is permitted, protected, or even compelled by the law
of the state in which the act or acts occurred or of which the ac-
cused is a national, or the like. It is one thing for Belgium to
acquiesce in the United States' trying an American sailor for
murder committed on an American ship at anchor in a port on
the Congo River 250 miles from the sea,23 and another for
England to acquiesce when an American court orders a British
corporation to reconvey patents to an American corporation in
contradiction of a contractual obligation to a second British
corporation.24 It is one thing for Brazil to acquiesce in the United
States' trying an American for defrauding a United States
to the limit of its power, it is not difficult to see that a multiplicity of
conflicting and overlapping burdens would blight international carriage
by sea. Hence, courts * * * have generally deferred to a non-national or
international maritime law of impressive maturity and universality. It
has the force of law not from extraterritorial reach of national laws,
nor from abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from ac-
ceptance by common consent of civilized communities of rules designed
to foster amicable and workable commercial relations.
"International or maritime law in such matters as this does not seek
uniformity and does not purport to restrict any nation from making and
altering its laws to govern its own shipping and territory. However,
it aims at stability and order through usages which considerations of
comity, reciprocity and long-range interest have developed to define the
domain which each nation will claim as its own. Maritime law, like our
municipal law, has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts between
competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between
the transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws
are involved. * * * [I]n dealing with international commerce we can-
not be unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations
are to be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which
we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign
transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country
to apply its law to an American transaction."
23 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
** United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; British Nylon Spinners,
Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. [1952], 2 All E.R. 780; British
Nylon Spinners v. I.CI. Ltd. [1954], 3 All E.R. 88.
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Government corporation in Brazil,25 another for, say, England to
acquiesce in prosecution by some dictator of a British publisher
for criticizing the dictator in a British newspaper. A valid
generalization may be made that, for the reasons already sug-
gested, the state in which the activity occurs has the primary
interest, but at best it is only a generalization. Unhappily it is
in precisely those instances in which their policies diverge the
most that one state is most likely to seek to extend the application
of its law and another state to resist that extension. Efforts of
the United States to extend the reach of the Volstead Act 26 are
illustrative. A nice question, more of policy than law, is raised,
how far a state should seek to implement its own policies by
extending the reach of its criminal law against the vigorous op-
position of a state with contrary views. Fairness, in terms of
notice, should be a factor. Here again, a generalization may be
made that the fairness of an assertion of extraterritorial juris-
diction varies, depending on whether the conduct is or is not com-
monly regarded as criminal. Perhaps another generalization can
be made that trial at the place where the acts occurred is more
feasible, and hence likely to be fairer, than trial elsewhere.
The right to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals
for their acts abroad is often broadly affirmed,27 but is used only
86 "Clearly it is no offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of Brazil
to hold them for this crime against the government to which they owe
allegiance." United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922).
26 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
27 Article 30, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 87. Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws, sec. 43 f(l)(c). (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956);
Harvard Research, Crime, supra, note 2, at 519.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Company,
213 U.S. 347 (1909), indicated at least antipathy towards the exercise of
jurisdiction based on nationality, but the issue was the interpretation of a
statute rather than the reach of Congressional power, and the case was
further complicated because the action complained of was that of the Costa
Rican government. After noting that governments, including the British and
American, had exercised jurisdiction so based, Mr. Justice Holmes said at p.
346: "But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done. * * * For another jurisdiction, if it should
happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
11
sparingly, particularly by those states in the common law tradi-
tion.28 It can be rationalized as derived from allegiance, as a kind
of quid pro quo for the protection accorded citizens and activities
abroad. The rationalization is more convincing where the offense
is against the state itself, e.g., treason, than where it is against
an individual, e.g., murder of robbery.29 Cases of the latter type
in which jurisdiction is asserted when nationality is the only
link are relatively rare. Usually, there is a discernible impact on
or activity in the state's territory, or the requirement may be im-
posed that the offense be against a fellow national. Moreover, a
willingness to defer to foreign law is frequently manifested,
either by a requirement that the offense be punishable also by the
lex loci delecti, or by recognizing the primary right of the terri-
torial state to prosecute.30 The nationality principle may, on the
other hand, because of its respectability, be invoked in situations
in which it is not strictly applicable, as in the case of seamen not
nationals of the flag state or alien members of an armed force
abroad. One can, of course, speak of assimilated nationality, in
terms of temporary allegiance and a correlative claim to the
state's protection abroad. The real justification and motivation is,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent." See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
Any doubt as to the American position with respect to the nationality
principle was long since resolved. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S.
94 (1922) ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
28 Delaume, "Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed Abroad : French and
American Law," 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 173 (1952).
29 See the court's discussion in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922), et seq., stating that statutes relating to crimes against private in-
dividuals or their property are to be interpreted as not extending to "those
committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction" unless Congress has
expressly said so, but "the same rule of interpretation should not be
applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent
on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because
of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud
wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or
agents," and distinguishing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra,
note 28, as relating to "acts done by citizens of the United States against
other such citizens in a foreign country." See also Trautman, op. cit. supra,
note 4, at 312 and 324-326.
80 See generally on the nationality principle and the limitations generally
recognized in the laws of the several states, Harvard Research, Crime,
supra, note 2, at 523-535; Trautman, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 327 et seq.
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however, surely protection of those primary interests of a state;
the operation of its merchant marine and its national security.
If, as is normally the case, the seamen or members of the armed
forces are nationals, this may be an added factor, but its real
significance is likely to be in minimizing the conflicting interests
of another state.
The traditional analysis recognizes the competence of states
explicitly to utilize the protective principle to reach the activities
of aliens abroad when the security, territorial integrity, or in-
dependence of the state is threatened. 31 The argument for the
assertion of jurisdiction is essentially two-fold: (1) offenses of
81 The arguments for and against the exercise of jurisdiction on the pro-
tective principle are set forth in Brierly's Report on "Criminal Competence
of States in Respect of Offences Committed Outside their Territory," Com-
mittee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law,
and in DeVisscher's observations on the Report, Publications of the League
of Nations, 1926, V. 7, p. 2, 20 A.J.I.L. (Spec. Supp.) 252, at 255 (1926),
and in the Comments to Articles 7 and 8 of the "Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime," Harvard Research, Crime, supra, note
2, at 543-563. See also Article 33, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law,
p. 94.
Both the Draft Convention and the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law,
Article 33, distinguish between the crimes of counterfeiting or falsification of
the seals, currency, etc., and other crimes against the security, etc., of the
state. Both recognize the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction in the
first class of offences (Article 8 of the Draft Convention and Article 33 of
the Restatement), the Restatement noting that the United States has no
laws relating to such crimes committed outside its territory, other than 34
Stat. 100 (1906), 22 U.S.C. Sec. 1203 (1952), making it a crime to commit
perjury before consular and diplomatic officials of the United States. Ex-
change controls have created an offense comparable to counterfeiting, with
respect to which a state may seek to exercise jurisdiction on the protective
principle. See Public Prosecutor V. L., Supreme Court, Holland, Nov. 13,
1951, [1951] Int'l. L. Rep. 206 (No. 48).
The Draft Convention recognizes a qualified jurisdiction in the second
class of cases also, providing in Article 7: "A State has jurisdiction with
respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien against the
security, territorial integrity or political independence of that State, pro-
vided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not com-
mitted in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place
where it was committed." The Restatement is more guarded in that it both
limits the jurisdiction to "conduct outside its territory that threatens its
security as a State," and attaches a proviso that "the conduct is generally
recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems." See also Comment d to Article 33.
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this nature threaten the vital interests of the state; and (2) the
state in which they occur is likely to be indifferent regarding
them even if they are criminal under its law.32 Reliance on the
principle in all except the narrow range of offenses indicated is,
however, vigorously—perhaps too vigorously—resisted. It is sug-
gested that the difficulty is not with the basic idea, which may
indeed be the fundamental justification for any claim of jurisdic-
tion. The difficulty is rather that a state may assert jurisdiction
in reliance on the principle in circumstances in which the terri-
torial state or a third state either believes it has a superior claim
to assert jurisdiction or, of more importance, permits, protects, or
even compels the acts of the accused. The basic difference be-
tween counterfeiting a state's currency abroad and broadcasting
attacks on its government from a foreign radio station is not
in the threat to the state attacked. The threat may be of equal
magnitude, and even of like kind, since counterfeiting can be
utilized for political ends as well as private gain. The essential
difference lies rather in the protection which countries such as
our own properly accord to the right of free speech.
Much the same may be said of assertions of jurisdiction on the
passive personality principle,33 predicated on the nationality of
82 In Rex v. Holm and Rex v. Pienaar, Appellate Division, Union of South
Africa, [1947] Ann. Dig. 91, 92, (No. 33) involving treason by nationals
committed abroad, the court observed: "[S]o far as high treason committed
by a subject is concerned, there exists no international custom or comity
which debars a state from trying and punishing the offender no matter
where the offence has been committed. The reason for this is clear: it is
because high treason, committed outside the territory of the state concerned,
is an offence only against such state. No other state is interested in
punishing the offender, and the punishment of the offender by the state
concerned does not encroach upon the rights of other states."
The Court of Cassation of France held, in Re van den Plas [1955] Int'l.
L. Rep. 205, that a Belgian national could be prosecuted in France for
treasonable activities against Belgium committed in Belgium, under decrees
which applied the French criminal law governing crimes against the security
of the state to similar crimes against any state allied with France.
"The argument for the passive personality principle may be stated
simply: A state cannot be expected to tolerate the presence in its territory,
unpunished, of an alien who, while abroad, committed an offense against
one of its nationals which, if committed in its territory, would have been
punishable under its law. The opposing argument was stated by Judge
Moore in the dissenting opinion in the Lotus case, supra, note 3, at 92, 93:
"It is evident that this claim is at variance not only with the principle
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the victim, and the universality principle,34 predicating jurisdic-
tion simply on custody of the accused. If the assertion of jurisdic-
tion on either of these grounds is objectionable, it is not because
the state can have no discernible interest, though that interest is
of the exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its own territory, but also
with the equally well-settled principle that a person visiting a foreign
country, far from radiating for his protection the jurisdiction of his
own country, falls under the dominion of the local law and, except so far
as his government may diplomatically intervene in case of a denial of
justice, must look to that law for his protection.
"No one disputes the right of a State to subject its citizens abroad
to the operation of its own penal laws * * *. But the case is funda-
mentally different where a country claims either that its penal laws
apply to other countries and to what takes place wholly within such
countries or, if it does not claim this, that it may punish foreigners for
alleged violations, even in their own country, of laws to which they were
not subject."
The issue was raised in the well-known Cutting Incident, and Moore's Re-
port, [1887] Foreign Relations, U.S. 751, is a brief in opposition to the
assertion of jurisdiction by Mexico on this basis in that case. The issue was
raised again but not decided in the Lotus case; Moore's dissent reflects his
adherence to the views he had expressed forty years earlier. The wide-
spread criticism of the decision in the Lotus case culminated in its being
superseded in Article 11 of the Convention on the High Seas, 13 UST 2312,
TIAS 5200.
Both the Harvard Research, Crime, supra, note 2, at 579 and Article
30(2) of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 87, reject the passive
personality principle. Cf. In re Gonzalez (Mexico, Sup. Ct.), [1931-1932]
Ann. Dig. 151 (No. 79). The decision in The Attorney General of the
Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 56 A.J.I.L. 805 (1962), and the comment
that case provokes may well result in a change in attitudes toward the
assertion of jurisdiction on the passive personality and universality
principles.
84 Moore reserved his bitterest contempt for the assertion of jurisdiction
on this basis: "It is unnecessary to discuss this theory specifically, because
* * * it is so rhapsodical and cosmopolitan in its character, and, while in-
tended to be benevolent, is so impractical and intrusive, that it has never
assumed a legislative guise." Moore's Report, [1887] Foreign Relations,
U.S. 751.
It has been observed, however, that "One could, however, reasonably
maintain that there is a common interest in punishing 'crime,' irrespective
of where it takes place, at least to the extent that there is agreement on
what acts are 'criminal,' what is reasonable punishment and what constitutes
fair procedure. The policy that crimes committed in one state are of no
concern to others is a short-sighted and self-defeating one that, absent
treaty, results only in harboring and protecting criminals." Katzenbach, op.
cit. supra, note 11, at 1143.
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likely to be less than overwhelming. After all, there is no bright
line between these principles and the objective territorial prin-
ciple, since impact is necessarily a vague concept and objection
must come primarily from other factors. Conspicuous among
these is not only whether the states involved take the same or
different attitudes towards the accused's activities but also con-
siderations of feasibility and fairness, which are always very
much at the fore whenever extraterritorial jurisdiction is in
issue.35
The greater the depth of inquiry into the problems of jurisdic-
tion, the greater the appreciation of its many possible facets. A
situation is rarely encountered which presents one facet in isola-
tion. A cumulation of factors on one side must be balanced with
those on the other. The only logical conclusion seems to be reached
by the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws (Sec. 43 e), that
a state has jurisdiction "* * * * [I]f its contacts with a person,
thing or occurrence are sufficient to make it reasonable * * *."
Certainly this is true in a problem so complex as that raised by
visiting armed forces.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
It is implicit in all discussions of the problem of criminal
jurisdiction that jurisdiction in the sense of the right to enforce
or execute the law is exclusively territorial. That jurisdiction in
this sense, which includes the right to arrest, charge, try and
punish, is, with only the narrowest exceptions, exclusively terri-
torial has been recognized in a wide range of situations.36 This
86 "To the extent that the conduct itself is commonly considered criminal,
jurisdiction amounts to no more than broadened venue and is objectionable
only in so far as it might, on particular facts, put an unfair burden on
defendant in terms of securing evidence, or possibly, be a less efficient place
to prosecute for the same reason." Katzenbach, op. cit. supra, note 11, at
1144. See also Harvard Research, Crime, 29 supra, note 2, at 580-581,
quoting the opinions of Fusinato, Mercier and Donnedieu de Vabres; Article
34, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 96.
""Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law
upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the con-
trary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be ex-
ercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive
rule derived from international custom or from a convention." The Lotus
Case, supra, note 3, at 18, 19. "It is, of course, universally accepted that no
state can perform acts of sovereignty inside the territory of another, nor
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precludes seizure of a foreign merchant vessel on the high seas,37
or in the territorial waters of another state,38 or of a vessel of
the captor's nationality in a foreign port.39 The disability to
exercise police power in a foreign territory 40 extends to trans-
porting a prisoner through the territory of another state without
its consent.41 The right to exercise such jurisdiction within the
can it send its officials on to foreign soil to arrest, try, or punish offenders
there, whoever they may be or whatever they may have done." Beckett,
"The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners," 1925 Brit. Yb.
Int'l. L. 44. See also Article 20, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 64.
87 Chief Justice Marshall, in Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279
(1808) said: "It is not easy to conceive a power to execute a municipal law,
or to enforce obedience to that law, without the circle in which that law
operates. A power to seize for the infraction of a law, is derived from the
sovereign, and must be exercised, it would seem, within those limits which
circumscribe the sovereign power." See also Church v. Hubbart 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 234 (1804). Cf. Hudson and Smith v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
281 (1810).
88 The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824) ; The Anne, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 435 (1818) ; Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Vaugh, Brit. Min.,
Feb. 1828, M.S., Notes For. Leg. Ill 430, 2 Moore, International Law 21
(1906). Charge Lindsay to Secretary Colby, No. 230, Apr. 12, 1920, M.S.
Department of State, file 611.44 e 244/5, 2 Hackworth, International Law
320 (1941).
89 Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Wise, Minister to Brazil, Sept.
27, 1845, M.S. Inst. Brazil, XV, 119, 2 Moore, International Law 4 (1906).
*° In re Jolis, France, Tribunal Correctionnel d'Auesnes, [1933-1934] Ann.
Dig. 191 (No. 77), and authorities cited in the editorial note on 192. For
cases involving actions of police of the Canal Zone in the Republic of
Panama, see 2 Hackworth, International Law, 311 (1941). The United
States expressed its regrets when a Captain Haddock arrested a deserter in
Canadian territory; the Captain was dismissed and the deserter discharged.
Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, April
15, 1863, 60 Dom Ltr 231, 2 Moore, International Law, 370 (1906).
41 [1877] Foreign Relations, U.S. 266, et seq., 2 Moore, International Law
371 (1906). The Department of State later abandoned this supersensitive
attitude and indicated that, although the United States reserved its right to
object, it would ordinarily not do so. It could not, of course, undertake
to prevent a prisoner from bringing habeas corpus and, absent a treaty or
statute under which he could be held, he could obtain his liberty.
Memorandum from the Department of State to the Japanese Embassy, Mar.
2, 1907, M.S. Department of State, File 4904, 2 Hackworth, International
Law 317, 318 (1941). See also Ed. Note, Transit in Extradition Cases,
1 A.J.I.L., Part 1, 465 (1907); 4 Hackworth, International Law 216 (1942).
F.E. Hall, "Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown," 81
(1894) states that: "If a person on board a British ship commits a crime
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territory of a state is in fact so jealously guarded and meticu-
lously respected that a consul may not serve process unless the
authorities of the state to which he is accredited interpose no
objection.42
The principle that enforcement jurisdiction may, generally
speaking, be exercised only within a state's own territory needs
no elaborate justification. The effectiveness of a government
would be undermined, and the security of individuals in their
liberties threatened, if the law enforcement authorities of another
state, deriving their powers from another source and exacting
obedience to a foreign law, were free to operate at will within a
state. One may regret that these considerations have been so
persuasive as to lead states to deny even minimal assistance to
other states in law enforcement, except within the narrow limits
of the operation of extradition treaties; however, this is far
from saying that it would be desirable for states to be permitted
to exercise wide enforcement jurisdiction in other states. Ex-
perience suggests, rather, that where enforcement jurisdiction is
so exercised, by consent, not all the problems discussed above dis-
appear—in fact, some of them become more acute and new prob-
lems arise.
Given their traditional adherence in theory and in practice to
the territorial principle, some may consider it remarkable that the
Anglo-American countries should have exercised extraterritorial
jurisdiction, in the full—and common—sense of the term for so
long and in so extensive an area.43 No logical difficulty is pre-
sented here—the extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised by
consent—but the Anglo-American position rests on policy con-
on the high seas and is brought in custody into a foreign port, the terri-
torial authorities will not interfere with his being kept in custody on board,
nor with his being transferred to another vessel for conveyance to England."
Cf. Regina v. Lesley [1858-1860], Bell's C. Cas. 220, 8 Cox Crim. Cas, 269
(1860), where an indictment was sustained against the master of a British
ship who contracted with the Chilean government to convey to Liverpool
certain Chileans who had been ordered banished, for continuing to detain
the prisoners on the high seas, after leaving Chilean waters. Chile was, of
course, not the flag state nor could it claim territorial jurisdiction. For a
criticism of the holding, see 2 Moore, International Law 215 (1906). See
also Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, sec. 43 f (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956), which is expressly contra.
*2 2 Hackworth, International Law 119 (1941).
*3 See Justice Frankfurter's review of the history of extraterritoriality
in his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 58-64 (1956).
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siderations as well as logic. Factually it is accurate to say that
they departed from the territorial principle when circumstances
so dictated.
The United States at one time exercised extraterritorial juris-
diction in a broad belt of countries stretching from Morocco to
Japan. It did so for varying periods in different countries but
collectively for more than a century and a half. The first treaty
conceding American extraterritorial jurisdiction was that of 1787
with Morocco, 44 and Morocco was the last major country in
which it was surrendered
;
45 but at one time the list included
Borneo, China, Japan, Korea, Madagascar, Muscat, Morocco,
Persia, the Samoan Islands, Siam, Tripoli, Tunis and Turkey.46
The scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the
United States—and correlatively, the immunity enjoyed by its
nationals—varied from country to country. In China, from 1844
to 1943, it was virtually complete, although for the redress of
injuries suffered at the hands of a Chinese an American was
dependent on local law.47 The conduct of American nationals was
subject to the regulation only of American law.48 Since the reach
M Hinckley, "American Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient," 18 (1906).
*6 On October 6, 1956. Young, "The End of American Consular Jurisdic-
tion in Morocco," 51 A.J.I.L. 402 (1957).
48 2 Moore, International Law 593 (1906).
" The present comment will be limited largely to the China experience as
adequate to illustrate the nature of the jurisdiction exercised and the
problems to which the system gave rise.
"The Treaty of Wang-Hiya of July 3, 1844, 8 U.S. Statutes at Large
572, 1 Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and
Agreements Between the United States and Other Powers 1776-1909, 196-
202 (1910), the first Chinese-American treaty conceding extraterritoriality,
provided, in Article XXI, that "* * * citizens of the United States who may
commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only
by the Consul, or other public functionary of the United States, thereto
authorized, according to the laws of the United States." Hinckley notes
that Japan took the position that it had full sovereign power to prohibit
the commission of any crime; that the provisions of the Japanese treaty
related only to trial and punishment—to the remedy, not the obligation. It
was United States policy to require its citizens to observe the regulations
laid down by the local governments relating to security, good order, health
and general welfare, and to enforce them in the consular courts, but other
treaty powers took the position their nationals were subject only to their
country's laws, and in 1879 were "indisposed to enforce quarantine restric-
tions prescribed by Japan for preventing the bringing in of cholera from
other countries of the Far East." But the United States cooperated.
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of American criminal law is normally limited to American terri-
tory, and under the federal system criminal law is largely state
law, this raised a difficult problem, never quite satisfactorily
solved.49 Judicial authority was exercised primarily by the Ameri-
can consuls,50 but they were required in some instances to utilize
the assistance of other citizens, and limited jurisdiction, original
and appellate, was given the ministers.51
Consuls were authorized to issue warrants for the arrest of any
American,52 and the arrest was made by the consular marshal or,
where none was available, by a special constable or marshal ap-
pointed by the consul or by the local authorities at the request of
the consul. It appears that Americans could, on the other hand,
be arrested by the local police only in the act of committing
flagrant crime ; that even then they could not be jailed by the local
authorities, but had to be immediately turned over to their consul
;
and that the dwelling, place of business or ship of an American
could be entered to search for or arrest even native offenders, only
with the assent of the consul and, if he thought necessary, only in
the presence of a consular officer.53
The institution of protegees was never established in China.
Hinckley, op. cit. supra, note 44, at 98. The Treaty of 1858 read: "* * *
[C]itizens of the United States, either on shore or in any merchant vessel,
who may insult, trouble or wound the persons or injure the property of
Chinese, or commit any other improper act in China, shall be punished only
by the Consul or other public functionary thereto authorized, according to
the laws of the United States. Arrests in order to trial may be made by
either the Chinese or the United States authorities." 1 Malloy, Treaties,
Article XI, 211, 215 (1910).
49 The first statute implementing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion by the United States was that of 1848, 9 Stat. 276; a more comprehen-
sive act was passed in 1860, 12 Stat. 72. There were several amendments,
and these enactments were in 1878 consolidated in the Rev. Stat. Sees.
4083-4130.
60 There is reason to doubt such jurisdiction could now be constitutionally
conferred on consuls, in view of the comments on In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891) in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
81 Rev. Stat. Sees. 4089, 4090, 4109, 4095, 4106, 4102, 4103.
" Rev. Stat. 4087.
58 Hinckley, op. cit. supra, note 44, at 103. The scope of the right of the
Chinese police to arrest Americans, and of the correlative immunity of
Americans from arrest by them, is not clearly spelled out in the treaties.
It appears that the relative immunity of Americans from arrest by the
Chinese police was fortified and extended by custom. See 2 Moore, Interna-
tional Law 599 (1906).
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Protection was, however, given and American jurisdiction as-
serted not only with respect to citizens of the United States by
birth or naturalization and native inhabitants of its insular
possessions, but also with respect to seamen on American ships,
whatever their nationality. At least limited protection seems also
to have been accorded employees of American citizens.64
The century of American experience of extraterritorial juris-
diction in China, although not without its defenders,65 seems to
be viewed by many as evidencing a dubious choice between two
evils. Among the reasons which are said to have led to the in-
sistence on extraterritorial privileges are: (1) The Chinese law
of homicide was not sufficiently discriminating, and in dealing
with foreigners the existing discriminations were not observed;
(2) the system of punishment involved severe penalties and
humiliations, without thought of reformation or deterrence except
through fear and force, by such sanctions as death by slicing,
decapitation and strangulation; (3) torture both of the accused
and of witnesses was used, the accused being presumed guilty but
no punishment being possible without a confession; (4) condi-
tions in the prisons, used primarily for the detention of the ac-
cused and of witnesses before trial, rather than for punishment,
were intolerable, and many of the imprisoned died; (5) the prin-
ciple of vicarious responsibility was applied, to the family, the
town or other group, in criminal cases; (6) the administration of
64 Hinckley, op. cit. supra, note 44, at 78, 85 ; 2 Moore, International Law
588 (1906).
66 Hinckley apparently viewed it as in the nature of a missionary enter-
prise. His work, op. cit. supra, note 44, opens with the statement: "The
extension of European domination throughout much of the orient has, in our
own day, opened a prospect of wonderful development of eastern peoples in
general civilization, in methods of government necessary for protection of
life and property, and in conceptions of justice and of the utility and
authority of courts of law.
"Only one oriental nation, the Japanese, is thus far admitted actually to
have assimilated enough of western jurisprudence to entitle its government
to exercise full responsibility for the protection of foreigners within its
territory."
See also Denby, "Extraterritoriality in China," 18 A.J.I.L. 667, (1924)
for a vigorous defense of the system. The author, a one-time minister to
China, answers the argument sometimes made that traders in China in pre-
treaty days did not demand extraterritorial privileges with the observation
(p. 670) that "Foreigners sacrificed all personal considerations to secure
permission to trade."
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justice was in the hands of administrative officials, there being no
separate judiciary, and was notoriously corrupt; and (7) there
was a prejudice against foreigners.56
It is not surprising that the United States should have been
reluctant to see its nationals subjected to a system of justice
which had, or was said to have, these attributes. American extra-
territorial jurisdiction in actual operation has, however, been
criticized with perhaps equal vigor. The principal criticism was
that in practice American law-breakers enjoyed immunity from
punishment, at the same time that they demanded the most
vigorous enforcement of Chinese law against such Chinese as
offended against them. This is said to have produced great re-
sentment among the Chinese and intensified their anti-foreign
attitude.57
56 Williams, "The Protection of American Citizens in China : Extraterri-
toriality," 16 A.J.I.L. 43; (1922) Quigley, "Extraterritoriality in China," 20
A.J.I.L. 46 at 50 (1926). Quigley notes that on the Chinese side it was said
that most foreigners did not understand Chinese legal procedure, in general
the penalties imposed were no more severe than in European countries,
torture was not applied to foreigners, and decisions involving foreigners
were given in accordance with Chinese law.
67 "The strongest plea for the abolition of extraterritoriality lies in the
abuse of this privilege on the part of subjects of foreign Powers who use
it as a cloak for illegal acts. The continued smuggling of opium and
morphine into China is but a single example, although the most striking, of
the wrong that is being done to China under the cloak of a foreign extra-
territorial jurisdiction." Bishop, quoted in Quigley, op. cit. supra, note 56
at 59. Burlingame, Minister to China, wrote the State Department with
reference to the execution of one Buckley for murder: "Such men as * * *
Buckley had so long escaped punishment that they had come to believe that
they could take life with impunity. The United States authority was
laughed at and our flag was made the cover for all the villains in China."
[1864] Foreign Relations, U.S. Part 3, p. 400; Williams, charge d'affaires,
wrote the following year: "Cases have already occurred in China of aggra-
vated manslaughter, and even of deliberate killing of the natives by
foreigners, whose crimes have been punished by simple fines or mere deporta-
tion or short imprisonment; while foreigners strenuously insist on full
justice when life is taken by the natives; or maiming with intent to kill."
[1865] Foreign Relations, U.S. Part 2, p. 454. The Consul General at
Shanghai wrote in 1871: "It would be difficult to say that the extra-
territorial system is not often productive of injustice to the Chinese. * * *
A few years ago the Viceroy at Nanking, in presenting a case on behalf of
some poor boat people, whose vessel had been sunk by a foreign steamer, de-
clared that the frequency of such accidents had so aroused the people that
he feared they would endeavor to make reprisals should the foreign courts
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It has been said that partial and lax law enforcement are in-
herent characteristics of extraterritoriality. 58 Again, the assign-
ment of judicial functions to consuls, untrained in the law, pri-
marily concerned with protecting the interests of their nationals
and occupied with other duties, has been pointed to as a funda-
mental weakness of the system.59 The inability of the consul to
continue to refuse redress." [1871] Foreign Relations, U.S. 170; Williams, op.
cit. supra, note 56, at 49. In 1904, an unoffending Chinese of good standing
was thrown into the water by a group of drunken sailors, identified as
Americans, and drowned, but no one was ever brought to justice. Williams
says of this case that "A great deal of intense feeling was aroused in
Canton * * * and the native and foreign press was very caustic in com-
menting on this apparent breaking down of justice. The native press in
particular contrasted the indifference of the American enforcement of the
law in this case with the unusual energy displayed in demanding redress for
crimes committed against foreigners by Chinese. The American government
finally paid an indemnity of $1,500 to the family of the murdered man. But
the feeling was only partially allayed; and in the case of the Lienchou
murders a year later, when five Americans were killed, the Canton cor-
respondent of the North-China Herald attributed the anti-American feeling,
which was a partial cause of the crime, to the failure of justice in the case
of the murder at Canton." Williams, op. cit. supra, note 56, at 50.
68 "[T] here are strong reasons for expecting an indifferent administra-
tion of the law under a system of extraterritoriality. A crime is an offense
against society which society must punish. An aroused public opinion gives
vigor to the enforcement of the law, demands adequate police protection
and jail facilities and upholds the hands of the judiciary. With public
opinion awakened the machinery of the law will operate smoothly; but
when the public slumbers an inevitable inertia results. Under a system of
extraterritoriality the injured society is powerless to apply punishment to
foreigners who offend against it. Foreign officials must pass judgment upon
them. There is no aroused public sentiment urging the foreign government
to a vigorous enforcement of its laws. An indifference results, which is
only increased by the element of racial prejudice." Williams, op. cit. supra,
note 56, at 48, 49.
The strongest of proponents of the territorial principle observed: "The
privileged consular jurisdiction produces the desired effect of insuring the
European against the dangers of a barbarous criminal and civil tribunal;
but the advantages of an exemption from the natural system of territorial
jurisdiction can only be purchased at the price of much countervailing evil.
All foreign criminal jurisdiction, even that exercised by a civilized on the
soil of an uncivilized nation, is a feeble and defective instrument, and the
tendency of the privileged European jurisdiction in the Turkish Empire is
stated, in general, to be the impunity of the European criminal." Lewis,
Foreign Jurisdiction and the Extradition of Criminals, 16 (1859).
• "The first duty of a Consul is to protect the interests of his sovereign's
subjects; it is scarcely consistent to add to that duty the task of adminis-
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compel the attendance of witnesses or to punish for prejury
witnesses not of American nationality, and other limitations on
his authority inherent in a jurisdiction based on nationality rather
than territorial sovereignty was another defect of the system.60
The same limitation gave rise to inequality in the treatment
accorded the nationals of the several powers exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction in China for the same acts. The small
number of consuls made the prosecution of offenses committed at
a distance from any consulate subject to the common shortcom-
tering justice when a complaint is brought against that subject; and the
duties of protection of a class and the administration of impartial justice
between that class and others cannot but clash. Only too often is the
verdict of the extraterritorial court a formula as of course, 'judgment for
the defendant,' and the defendant has then every reason to be satisfied
that he has an efficient consular service." Latter, quoted in Williams, op. cit.
supra, note 56, at 53.
"[I]n addition to his commercial functions, the consul of a treaty state
performs the numerous roles not only of a judge sitting over civil and
criminal actions instituted against his fellow nationals, of a coroner,
registrar, probate judge, and police magistrate, but also that of an advocate
in the court of the native defendant on behalf of his aggrieved fellow-
national. * * *
<<* * * They are unfitted for the task [of exercising judicial functions]
for three principal reasons: (1) Their first duty is to protect the interests
and persons of their nationals; (2) they are generally men not trained in
the law; and (3) their national bias often creeps unconsciously into their
action and decisions." Mah, "Foreign Jurisdiction in China," 18 A.J.I.L.
676 (1924), at 685, 688. See also Williams, op. cit. supra, note 56, at 51, 52.
60 «xhe jurisdiction of the ministers and consuls usually is limited to
proceedings against persons of their own nationality. In this sense na-
tionality operates as a limitation upon the jurisdiction; and in the same way
the nationality of the plaintiff, or even of a witness, may, in certain
contingencies, raise an obstacle to the effective exercise of jurisdiction."
2 Moore, International Law, 600 (1906).
"[T]he consular courts are empowered to take cognizance only of the acts
of their own nationals. In short, their jurisdiction is personal. This defect
conduces to the compromising of justice, because the court has no power to
compel a witness of another nationality to testify. Nor has the court power
to inflict punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, for perjury committed
by a person of another nationality." Mah, op. cit. supra, note 59, at 688.
"The United States consul at Kanagawa [Japan] having fined for con-
tempt a British subject who, as a witness, refused to answer certain ques-
tions, the British consul, to whom application was made for the enforcement
of the penalty, refused to require either the payment of the fine or to im-
pose the alternative of imprisonment for non-payment * * *." 2 Moore,
International Law, 604 (1906).
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ings of trials remote from the place where the crime was com-
mitted.61 The lack of prison facilities on occasion led to the free-
ing of convicted criminals.62
The foregoing review of our experience of exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction in China is not intended to suggest that
the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over our troops abroad
is subject to the same criticisms. It does, however, warn that
there are inherent difficulties in any exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction which can, at best, only be minimized.
81 Minister Reed is quoted as saying: "The foreigner who commits a rape
or murder a thousand miles from the seaboard is to be gently restrained,
and remitted to a Consul for trial, necessarily at a remote point, where
testimony could hardly be obtained or ruled on." Williams, op. cit. supra,
note 56, at 53, quotes from a pamphlet of the Chinese National Welfare
Society in America, "The Shantung Question, A Statement of China's
Claims, etc.," (1919), p. 164:
"But if the latter [the consul] is stationed, as he generally is, at a great
distance from the scene of the crime, the accused is practically assured of his
liberty because the personal appearance at court of native witnesses is
made most difficult, if not impossible, owing to the poor communications, and
the time and expense required to make the trip. Insufficiency of evidence
has too frequently resulted in the denial of justice."
63 Minister Reed, referring to the situation after fourteen years of the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, said: "We extort from
China 'ex-territoriality', the amenability of guilty Americans to our law,
and then we deny to our judicial officers the means of punishing them. There
are consular courts in China to try American thieves and burglars and
murderers, but there is not a single jail where the thief or burglar may be
confined. * * * I consider the exaction of 'ex-territoriality' from the Chinese,
so long as the United States refuse or neglect to provide the means of
punishment, an opprobrium of the worst kind. It is as bad as the coolie or
the opium trade." Sen. Doc. 30, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 355, Williams,
op. cit. supra, note 56, at 49.
